Linguistic Apprehension as Incidental Sensation in Thomas Aquinas

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Abstract: In this paper I will delineate the psychological operations and faculties required for linguistic apprehension within a Thomistic psychology. This will require first identifying the proper object of linguistic apprehension, which will then allow me to specify the distinct operations and faculties necessary for linguistic apprehension. I will argue that the semantic value of any linguistic term is a type of incidental sensible and that its cognitive apprehension is a type of incidental sensation. Hence, the faculties necessary for the apprehension of any linguistic term's semantic value will be the cogitative power and the intellect. The cogitative power, because it is the faculty of particular intentions, and the intellect, because it is the faculty of universal intentions.

Thomas Aquinas rarely treats at length philosophical problems on the relationship between thought and language.[1] But the very little he does say has generated a large body of literature from his commentators, especially due to the last century's so-called "linguistic-turn." Most of this literature treats such philosophical problems as how we are able to form sentences that express our thoughts,[2] how terms are able to supposit for things,[3] whether thought and language have intentionality,[4] whether linguistic terms signify thoughts or things,[5] and to what extent thought in itself is a "mental language" or has any "structural" parallels to semantics and syntax, i.e., is there some mentalese?[6] Within all this literature, however, I have not been able to find any extended discussion on the role of the cogitative power (*vis cogitativa*) in relation to language and thought.[7] Similarly, I have not been able to find any sustained treatment that addresses which cognitive faculties must be operative for such commonplace achievements as grasping the meaning of a friends' utterance or understanding words on a page.[8]

In this paper I will attempt to delineate the psychological operations and faculties required for linguistic apprehension within a Thomistic philosophical anthropology. This will require first identifying the proper object of linguistic apprehension, which will then allow me to specify the distinct operations and faculties

 Proceedings of the ACPA, Vol. 84

necessary for linguistic apprehension.[9] I will argue that the semantic value of any linguistic term is a type of incidental sensible and that its cognitive apprehension is a type of incidental sensation. If this is true it entails that the faculties necessary for the apprehension of any linguistic term's semantic value will be the cogitative power and the intellect: the cogitative power because it is the faculty of particular intentions, and the intellect as the faculty of universal intentions.[10] I will note here at the beginning that the aims of this paper are primarily philosophical; however, I believe that the theses of this paper are not only consistent with the texts of Aquinas, but also provide the most plausible exegesis of the relevant Thomistic texts.

I. Linguistic-use Is a Property of the Human Person

Before taking up the central problem I must first distance this paper's interpretation of language-use from a number of problems and confusions other interpretations seem to have. It is important to note that while I agree with many Thomists who hold that language-use seems to be a distinctive feature of human beings, nevertheless I do not agree with the common presentation that language-use *only* reveals something significant to us about the intellect. As the extended treatments of Etienne Gilson, David Braine, Alasdair MacIntyre[11] and many others make clear, if language-use is distinctive of man, then it must reveal something about the *whole* human person, i.e., of his rational animality.[12]

It will be the contention of this paper that we cannot develop an adequate Thomistic account of the psychology of language-use without accounting for the linguistic functions performed by the inner senses, especially the cogitative power. Unfortunately, many interpretations tend to exaggerate the role of the intellect in language-use, which has resulted in a kind of bifurcation that is altogether foreign to Thomistic psychology.[13] This dualism is found in interpretations that segregate language-use to the intellect, which in turn entails that the sense faculties and their operations become irrelevant to what is internal to language-use, namely, semantics. Two difficulties emerge from this position, and I believe we can better understand them both if we look to the origins of this interpretation.

The source of this problem seems to rests in a misinterpretation of what exactly constitutes language-use by human persons *as* rational animals.[14] As is well known, Thomas Aquinas held that rationality, which is seated in man's intellect,[15] is the principle that differentiates man from other animals;[16] and since many philosophers today tend to identify language-use as the preeminent manifestation of this principle of rationality, the natural inference *seems* to be that we should place language-use solely within the domain of man's highest faculty, viz., the intellect.[17] Despite the popularity of this position the facts of language and a number of texts in Aquinas force us—both philosophically and exegetically—to think otherwise. To begin with, language-use cannot be a feature of the intellect alone for the simple reason that language necessarily consists in a material component. Now the intellect, according to Thomas Aquinas, is immaterial,[18] and this is because its proper object is a universal, immaterial intelligibility—which specifies its *per se* operations and consequently the

ontological character of the power itself.[19] So even though this intelligibility is an abstracted quiddity found within material things,[20] *as* intellectually understood, it exists as an immaterial intentional being.

No one doubts that such universals are inextricable to the many predications used in forming sentences; it is quite clear that without universals man would be unable to have language. However, a word, i.e., a linguistic term, is not itself a strictly immaterial being like a universal conceived by the intellect. All linguistic terms are written or spoken publically or imaged privately—like, for instance, when I subvocalize or speak to myself. In other words, all linguistic terms must be in part a kind of visible, audible, or tactile sensible. Indeed, Aristotle tells us as much, he says that: "Voice is a certain sound of an animate being." And, "A noun is a vocal sound which is significant by convention."[21] Clearly these sensible media, whether spoken or written, are neither universal nor strictly immaterial. Considering these facts alone it is difficult to understand why so many Thomists are inclined to say something so very Cartesian. As putative as it might be to some philosophers that language-use entails the intellect, and is therefore in some sense immaterial, it should be just as obvious that language-use is always cast and expressed within various written or spoken sensibles, which are material things.[22] These are the facts which Gilson calls the "philosophical constants of language."

Now however problematic this latter difficulty might be, I think a second difficulty entirely undermines the philosophical plausibility of this line of interpretation. As we have mentioned, this position entails a kind of dualism because it attributes semantic apprehension exclusively to the intellect, and places the apprehension of linguistic expressions as visual, audible, and tactile sensibles entirely on the side of sensation. Now if the intellect alone is semantically involved, this entails that semantics are intrinsically and exclusively intellectual. But since the intellect is only directly concerned with abstracted universals, we are then forced to eliminate from semantics all meanings concerned with circumstantial singular things and events which are here and now. Hence, all singular or particular meanings become inherently impossible on this account of language-use. Clearly the consequences of this thesis are unacceptable, but not only are they philosophically untenable, they are completely inconsistent with Aquinas's own doctrine.

We only need to examine one text from the *Summa Theologiae* to confirm this exegetical point. In Ia.86.1, the first objection presents an argument which denies the thesis that our intellect only cognizes universals. The argument is based on the fact that we are clearly able to cognize and form the proposition "Socrates is a man." And since the term "Socrates" is singular, the intellect must be able to cognize the singular.[23] Aquinas's reply to this objection is assimilated into the body of the article's response; however, we need not consider his whole response since the most pertinent part for our purposes comes at the very end of the body.

Contrary to the objection, Aquinas maintains the thesis that the intellect only directly cognizes the universal, but adds the qualification that the intellect can indirectly cognize the singular in the phantasm. And it is in this indirect way that we are able to form the proposition "Socrates is a man."[24] But what does Aquinas mean

here when he says that it is through cognition of the singular *as* by a phantasm that we are able to form a proposition with the singular term "Socrates" as its subject? Aquinas's reply to the second objection will provide us with a more complete answer to this question.

The second objection is similar to the first in that it tries to establish that the intellect does cognizes singulars because we do in fact form propositions with singular terms. The argument notes that the practical intellect is ordered towards action, and since action is singular, the intellect must therefore be able to cognize the singular. Aquinas contends that a singular conclusion cannot be drawn from a universal proposition without the medium of a singular proposition. But the latter, he qualifies, can only be formed by a particular apprehension. This particular apprehension is an operation which he attributes to the sensitive part of man. He then cites Aristotle's *de Anima* III. 11, in support of his answer.[25]

I believe Aquinas's two responses reveal that the objectors have made the same mistake which we considered before, namely, that of equating semantics use exclusively with the intellect and so making all meaning a proper object of the intellect. My interpretation to the contrary hinges in part on what Aquinas means by phantasms and the particular apprehension of the sensitive part.

According to Aquinas, following Avicenna and Averroes, phantasms are the particular cognitive items formed by the higher internal senses,[26] i.e., by the internal sensorium, in contrast to the external sensorium, which does not form phantasms. The external sensorium includes the five external senses along with the common sense faculty (*sensus communis*). The internal sensorium, for Aquinas, includes the imagination, the cogitative power and memory.[27] So which of the faculties of the internal sensorium does Aquinas have in mind when he makes reference to the phantasms that make possible our ability to form propositions with singular terms?

I think it is quite clear that when the *propositional term* "Socrates" is formed, we are not dealing with some kind of image formed by the imagination. One does not form an eidetic image or picture in their imagination for the subject of the proposition, and then form in their intellect the concept "man" for the predicate. The composition of the latter elements could only produce some sort of chimerical half-image half-conceptual proposition. As bizarre as that mental item sounds, I believe this is one of two positions entailed by the dualist interpretation introduced above.

Since the imagination has been eliminated as a viable option, it remains for us to discern whether the phantasms that are formed to serve as singular terms in propositions are formed in the memory or the cogitative power. Aside from the fact that the proper object of memory, viz., the intention of pastness, is irrelevant to at least the term "Socrates," the memory is itself identified by Aquinas as the retentive faculty of the cogitative power's apprehension.[28] So we are left with the cogitative power as the only viable faculty to fulfill this role.

When Aquinas states in his reply to the second objection that the singular proposition is formed by the particular apprehension of a faculty found in the sensitive part of the soul, we should understand this as a clear reference to the cogitative power. But if there was any doubt in the matter, Aquinas makes this connection

explicit in his commentary on the *de Anima* passage, which was cited in his reply to the second objection, and also in such parallel passages as the commentary on the *Sentences* IV, d. 50, q. 1, a. 3, *On Truth* 10.5 and the commentary on *Nicomachean Ethics* VI. lt. 1, 7, and 9.[29]

This is significant because it also reveals that Aquinas's account of practical reason requires that there be an inner sense faculty, which he refers to as the "cogitative faculty," that is able to form singular terms and propositions. More germane to our own concerns is that it reveals that semantic notions are not restricted to the intellect alone but are also to be found in the cogitative faculty's formation of singular terms and propositions.

II. Three Senses of Verbum in Aquinas

Now that we have sufficiently cleared away a number of mistaken interpretations about the intellect's exclusive claim to semantic apprehension and expression, we can proceed to the primary aim of this paper. This task has been made easier now that I have eliminated a predominant misinterpretation and confusion surrounding the problem of linguistic apprehension and its concomitant counterpart in linguistic expression. In the next section I will attempt to make clear what the proper object of linguistic apprehension is.

It will be instructive to begin with an examination of what Aquinas has to say about words before we attempt to formulate our own account of the proper object of linguistic apprehension. Aquinas treats of the different senses of the term "word" (*verbum*) in a number of texts; overall his analysis consistently identifies three proper senses of *verbum*.[30]

1. Word of the Heart (*verbum cordis*)[31]
2. Interior Word; image of voice the likeness of the vocal word (*verbum interius*; *verbum . . . quod habet imaginem vocis verbum speciei vocis*)
3. Vocal Word (*verbum vocis*)

The "word of the heart" is also often identified by Aquinas as the concept, ratio, or intention formed by the intellect.[32] It is the term of the intellect's operation and is described as that by which (*quo*) and as that in which (*in quo*) the extramental thing (*res quae sunt extra animam*) is understood.[33] The "interior word" is described as being an image of the "vocal word." This is the word or audible image, formed by the imagination when we speak to ourselves; it is "the interior language, or interior word, that Thomas holds as the model according to which we think aloud."[34]

Finally, there is the "vocal word" which is spoken out loud in ordinary meaningful human utterances. This "vocal word," as well as the "interior word" of the imagination, signifies the concepts or words of the intellect, through which we grasp things.[35] In addition to this threefold distinction of *verbum*, we should also note that in his commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* Aquinas remarks that words have three modes of existence, one in the conceptions of the intellect, another in vocal utterances, and a third as written.[36]

Based on these texts we can see that Aquinas has distinguished four different kinds of words; that each word is proper to a different cognitive faculty; and that there is a hierarchy or proper order amongst these words. The "word of the heart" is proper to the intellect; the "interior word" is proper to the imagination; the "vocal word" is proper to voice for expression[37] but, in part, to the auditory faculty for apprehension; and the "written word" is proper to vision (or tactility, in the case of Braille).

Concerning the hierarchy of words, the "word of the heart" is the primary instance of *verbum*, which all other senses of *verbum* signify. It is this sense of *verbum* that is intrinsically meaningful in its intentional content, and is therefore necessarily required as the principle by which all other *verbum* are able to carry any semantic value.[38] Also, the "word of the heart" is the only sense of *verbum* that is properly used in theological discussions concerning the nature of God.[39] The other senses of *verbum* can only be used metaphorically in God-talk; this is because, as Aquinas notes, the "word of the heart" is the only sense that consists in the intellect alone.[40] That is to say, the other senses of *verbum* are all intrinsically are bound up with matter (*as* image, sound, written, and *hic et nunc*) and cannot properly signify the immaterial perfections of the transcendent deity.[41]

It is these latter derivative senses of *verbum* that will be the focus of the remainder of this paper. The word as spoken (publically or privately in images) and as written is what I shall call a "linguistic term." A "linguistic term" is any conventional sound (e.g., phonemes), visible symbol (e.g., graphemes), or tactile patterns (e.g., Braille) that, by human convention and use, contains or is imbedded with a semantic value.[42] Thematized hylomorphically, a linguistic term consists of a formal component, viz., a semantic value, and a material component, viz., some sensible media.[43]

III. The Proper Object of Linguistic Apprehension

This account of linguistic terms is sufficient to provide us with at least a quasi-proper object. Thus far we have established that the proper object of linguistic apprehension is a linguistic term, which is a material sensible informed by a semantic value. One should recognize immediately that there are a number of problems with this quasi-proper object of language. But it is these very difficulties which I believe illuminate for us a salient feature of language, which has been recognized by not a few philosophers and linguists. Gilson quotes one linguist who nicely captures for us the precise difficulty there is in attempting to ascribe to language a single proper object, operation, and faculty.

> "Physiologically, speech is an overlaid function, or to be more precise, a group of overlaid functions. It gets what service it can out of organs and functions, nervous and muscular, that have come into being and are maintained for very different ends than its own." The appropriate function of teeth is to masticate, that of the palate is to taste; yet language superimposes on their natural functions that of contributing to the articulation

> of speech. One could truly say that a transcendent power "uses" the body for ends of a transcendent order akin to itself.[44]

This is not only true of language's ability to use organs and psychological faculties for its own ends, but of sensible media as well.[45] Language is able to "enrich" sensibles, i.e., material qualities which are natively semantic-less, with a fecundity of meaning.[46]

It is for this reason that there cannot be a proper object, operation, or faculty for the psychological apprehension and expression of language. Herein also resides the root of the confusion had by those philosophers that mistakenly place linguistic-use, notably semantic apprehension, entirely within the domain of the intellect. Language-use is a polyvalent ability that utilizes in concert material things, organs, and faculties, i.e., realities which have their own proper ends, and it uses all of them for its own linguistic ends. In other words, what we will have to look for is not a single proper object, operation and cognitive faculty, but a polymorphic object that is apprehended by the concurrent operations of various faculties for a synergic linguistic end, which is not to say a *sui generis* end. This also means that various faculties might have in common that their proper objects are often found in and through the apprehension of linguistic terms.

We are now in a position to begin delineating the operations and faculties necessary for linguistic apprehension. Since all cognition begins with the senses[47] we must begin our account of linguistic apprehension by explicating the sensible characteristics of linguistic terms before we can treat of their semantic values.

IV. Linguistic-terms as Essential and Incidental Sensibles

Aquinas's paradigmatic division of sensibles is threefold.[48] There are two kinds of sensibles which are sensed essentially (*per se*) and a third kind that is only said to be sensed accidentally (*per accidens*). The two sensibles that are sensed essentially are divided into the proper and common sensibles. Proper sensibles are uniquely sensed by a single external sense faculty, and are therefore *proper* to it alone. Common sensibles are essentially sensed, but are not exclusively apprehended by any one external sense faculty; rather they are able to be cognized by a number of different external senses.[49] For example, motion is sensed by vision, auditory, and tactile powers, hence, motion is a common sensible. Color, on the other hand, is not apprehended by any other sense faculty, and is therefore proper to vision alone.[50] Lists of proper sensibles typically include color, sound, odor, flavor, and tactile qualities (like thermals, textures, density, rarity, etc.). Aquinas's examples of common sensibles often include number, motion/rest, dimension, and shape.[51]

The proper sensibles common to most linguistic terms would be colors, sounds, and tactile sensibles, which are the proper objects of vision, auditory, and tactile faculties. We should not fail to note that each of these linguistic terms' proper sensible is also going to be inextricably constituted by some common sensible, like dimension, shape or number. Nevertheless, what is relevant to this paper are proper sensibles for they are able to specify distinct cognitive operations and faculties, whereas common sensibles by definition do not.

There should be nothing surprising in this analysis of the putative fact that linguistic terms are in part some kind of sensible, most likely a visible, audible, or a tactile quality. It seems that it is only overlooked because these sensibles are not the most salient aspect of our unified cognition of linguistic meaning as apprehended in conversation, reading, and writing. In other words, even though these sensibles provide the media that make linguistic communication possible, nevertheless, our conscious orientation is directed to the semantic value of linguistic terms and not to their distinctive characteristics *as* sensibles. This latter insight brings us to our next point.

Strictly speaking, sensibles are meaningless, which raises the question: how are we able to perform the ubiquitous operations of linguistic apprehension and expression through sensation if sensibles are in themselves entirely meaningless, and hence without any essential semantic value of themselves? Clearly linguistic apprehension is concurrent with sensation, but sensibles *as such* are devoid of any semantic value. What is it in material realities that admit of a semantic value and how is this apprehended through sensation?

V. Linguistic-terms as Incidental Sensibles

In order to answer these questions we will have to examine a third kind of sensible, namely, incidental sensibles. Aquinas gives us two conditions for something to be classified as an incidental sensibles. First, an incidental sensible must be accidentally connected with an essential sensible. For example, this man might be white, that dog might stink, this frying pan might be hot, and that moving object is alive. There is nothing intrinsic to sensibles like white, stinky odors, or heat that they be connected with cognoscible realities like man, dog, frying pan, or living concrete particulars. But it is the case that in *these* instances such cognoscibles are connected to *these* sensibles as concurrent with *these* sensations, and are thus incidental sensibles. The second condition is that the incidental sensible must be apprehended by the same cognitive agent that is sensing. Without this condition there would be no reason for saying that some cognoscible is also sensed incidentally.[52]

A key feature of incidental sensibles, strictly speaking, is that no external sense faculty can cognitively apprehend incidental sensibles. In other words, the external senses are unable to cognitively receive incidental sensibles, which is not to say that such sensibles are not received by the external senses at all. Aquinas makes this qualification to preclude a potential ambiguity in the term incidental sensible. Without this qualification, one could regard a sweet flavor as an incidental sensible to a colored red thing. To clarify the proper extension of the term Thomas qualifies that while in a broader sense it is true that redness is incidental to any flavor *qua* flavor, nevertheless, the salient feature of being an incidental sensible in the strict sense is that they are not *per se* sensed by any external sense faculty at all. Hence, even though red and sweet are incidental to each other, both color and flavor are *per se* sensibles in their own right.[53]

What the notion of incidental sensible reveals is that there are other cognoscible features of things in reality that are simultaneously apprehended through the

essential sensibles of external sensation, but are not themselves apprehended by any external sense faculty. But if incidental sensibles are not cognized by any external sense faculty, are they cognized by some internal sense or are they apprehended by some non-sensory cognitive faculty? Further, and more importantly, what are these incidental sensibles essentially in themselves?

Answering the latter question first will provide us with a proper object for the former. Aquinas tells us that these incidental sensibles are in themselves essentially cognoscible realities, even though they are by definition accidental to sensibles *qua* sensibles. Following Avicenna, Aquinas calls these cognoscible realities *intentions*, as distinct from sensibles or sensible forms.[54] Cognoscibles like *this* man and man, Socrates, *this* beast and beast, *this tree* and tree, and living are all different instances of cognoscible intentions found in reality that are not sensibles apprehended by the external senses.[55] These cognoscible intentions also admit of a further division between those that are of the singular and particular circumstances and those that are abstracted from the here and now and are universal. It is this latter division between particular and universal intentions that Aquinas employs to specify two different faculties necessary for their apprehension. Aquinas asserts that universal intentions are apprehended and formed by the intellect, whose proper object is universal cognoscibles. The particular intentions are apprehended and formed by man's inner sense faculty, which, as we said above, Aquinas calls the cogitative power (*vis cogitativa*),[56] passive intellect (*intellectus passivus*),[57] or particular reason (*ratio particularis*),[58] and these particular intentions are the proper object of the cogitative power.[59]

VI. Summation

At this point it will be instructive to draw together and synthesize what this paper's three distinct lines of inquiry have revealed. At the beginning of this paper it was shown both philosophically and exegetically that semantic apprehension is not exclusive to the intellect, because there are putative instances of singular meanings that are apprehended and formed by the cogitative. Our explication of the different senses of *verbum* within Aquinas clarified the reason for the intentional primacy of the "word of the heart" over all other senses of *verbum*. In addition, this latter analysis from the second part provided the third part with a philosophically tenable quasi-proper object of linguistic apprehension, what I have called a "linguistic term." This third analysis revealed that linguistic terms are a polymorphous object composed of a formal semantic component and a material sensible component. In seeking to understand how these polymorphous linguistic terms can be apprehended psychologically, it has been helpful to analyze them in light of Aquinas's threefold division of proper, common, and incidental sensibles. Finally, our consideration of incidental sensibles has brought us back to the proper objects of the intellect and cogitative, namely, universal and particular intentions, respectively. This latter point has only shown further evidence that semantic values are not inherently intellectual, but are also grasped by the cogitative, which is a sense faculty.

VII. Concluding Remarks: The *Verbum Cogitativae* and Linguistic Apprehension as *Incidental Sensation*

In light of the foregoing it should be clear that the singular and universal semantic values from the first section map nicely onto what, in the context of incidental sensation, Aquinas calls universal and particular intentions. Perhaps for the sake of clarity we should make the qualification that intentions should only be considered to have a semantic value if they are linguistically apprehended or expressed.[60] But where does the *verbum cordis*, that is, the "word of the heart" fit within this picture? I think a complete analysis of the Thomistic texts reveals that the *verbum cordis* is synonymous with the intellect's formation of universal intentions or concepts and universal propositions. What is different now, however, is that we have discovered another type of intention that is not strictly universal; a type of intention and singular semantic value that is grasped and formed in the cogitative, not the intellect. What relationship do these cogitative particular intentions and singular propositions have to the *verbum cordis*? Although I do not have time to argue for this here, I would suggest that we recognize another analogical and derivative sense of the *verbum cordis* that also applies beyond the intellect to the particular intentions formed by the cogitative, that is, a *verbum cogitativae* like the *verbum vocis*.[61]

Before concluding, one final point must be made concerning the particular and universal intentions apprehended by the cogitative and intellect. The apprehension of these intentions can only be designated as incidental sensation of incidental sensibles when these intentions are cognized by the cogitative or intellect simultaneously with acts of sensation of some one or more external senses.[62] But in the case of our apprehension of linguistic terms it seems there is always a simultaneous apprehension of a material and formal component. Hence, if semantic values are never apprehended independently of some material component, e.g., some sound or visual character, then linguistic terms are always apprehended as incidental sensibles. And it seems to me that if this is not globally the case, it is at least normative to linguistic apprehension.

In sum, I believe that this paper has sufficiently clarified a number of points about language-use and shown that, within a Thomistic psychology, semantics is not a matter which is exclusive to the intellect, that the cogitative plays an essential role in forming meaningful singular propositions, and finally, that it is philosophically necessary and fruitful to treat linguistic apprehension as a kind of incidental sensation.

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Notes

A previous version of this paper was presented at the Center for Thomistic Studies Colloquium Series, at the University of St. Thomas, Houston, Texas; the comments that I received during that talk and at the ACPA conference were very helpful. I would like to

thank Tony Lisska for his very kind and instructive commentary on this paper, as well as Mark Barker for the many stimulating conversions and correspondence which we have had on the *vis cogitativa* in Thomas Aquinas. This paper would not have been possible without his insightful work on the Angelic Doctor.

1. The *loci classici* seem to be: *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (Mandonnet, 2 vols., 1929) (henceforth: *In Sent*) I. d. 27.2.1.; *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* (Leonine v. 22) (henceforth: *DV*) 4.1 and 2.; *Summa contra gentiles* (Leonine, manual ed., 1934) (henceforth: *SCG*) I. 53 and IV. 11; *Summa theologiae* (Marietti, 1950–1953) (henceforth: *ST*) I. 13.1; 27.1; 34.1; 85.2, ad. 3; I-II. 93.1, ad 2.; *Sentencia libri De anima* (Leonine v. 45,1) (henceforth: *In DA*) II. 8, lt. 18.; *Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato* (Leonine v. 45,2) (henceforth: *In Sensu*) I. c.1.; *Quaestiones quodlibetales* (Marietti, 1956) (henceforth: *Quod*) V. 5.2.; *Expositio libri Peryhermenias* (Marietti, 1964) (henceforth: *In PH*) I and II.; *Lectura super Evangelium S. Ioannis* (Marietti, 1952) (henceforth: *In Ioannis*) c.1, lect. 1.

2. Etienne Gilson, *Linguistics and Philosophy: An Essay on the Philosophical Constants of Language*, trans. John Lyon (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) (henceforth: *Linguistics and Philosophy*); David Braine, *The Human Person: Animal and Spirit* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), c. XI, "The 'Objects' of the Mind in Speaking and Thinking," 398–446 (henceforth: *Human Person*).

3. Gyula Klima, "The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of Being," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996): 87–141 (henceforth: "Semantic Principles of Aquinas").

4. Anthony Kenny "Intentionality: Aquinas and Wittgenstein" in *Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives* ed. Brian Davies (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 243–256; David Braine, *Human Person*, 345–479; From *Analytical Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue*, ed. Craig Paterson and Matthew S. Pugh (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2006), see: Stephen Boulter, "Aquinas and Searle on Singular Thoughts" chapter 4, 59–78; Anthony Lisska, "Medieval Theories of Intentionality: from Aquinas to Brentano and Beyond" in chapter 8, 147–170; and John C. Cahalan "Wittgenstein as a Gateway to Analytic Thomism" in chapter 10, 195–214.

5. John Haldane "The Life of Signs," *The Review of Metaphysics* 47.3 (1994): 451–470. John O'Callaghan, "The Problem of Language and Mental Representation," *The Review of Metaphysics* 50.3 (1997); *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003); Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. David Burrell (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967) (henceforth: *Verbum*), 151–153; Harm Goris, *Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God's Infallible Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will*, Thomas Instituut Utrecht, 4 (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 1996), chapter 5: "Psychology: Human Tensed Way of Knowing," 184–212 (henceforth "Tensed Way of Knowing"); Stephen Boulter, "Aquinas and Searle on Singular Thoughts"; Gilson, *Linguistics and Philosophy*; Braine, *Human Person*, X–XII, 345–479; and Klima, "Semantic Principles of Aquinas."

6. Robert Pasnau, "Aquinas on Thought's Linguistic Nature" *The Monist: Analytical Thomism* 80.4 (1997): 558–557; Haldane, "Life of Signs"; Gilson, *Linguistics and Philosophy*; Braine, *Human Person* X–XII, 345–479 (esp. 440–445); Lonergan, *Verbum.*

7. Braine and Goris are exceptions. Both of their accounts, however, are more focused on the imagination and only mention the cogitative power in passing. Nevertheless, I have learned a lot from both of their extensive treatments of language and Thomistic psychology,

and I have made a serious effort to make my account compatible with their work. Currently, I know of only three dissertations written in English on the cogitative power. But there is nothing substantial said about language and psychology in any of these works. Cf. Mark Barker, *The Cogitative Power: Objects and Terminology*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Houston, University of ST, Thomas Center for Thomistic Studies, 2007; George P. Klubertanz, *The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the* Vis Cogitativa *According to St. Thomas Aquinas* (St. Louis, Mo.: Modern Schoolman, 1952); Leo A. White, *The Experience of Individual Objects in Aquinas*, Diss. CUA, 1997 (Ann Arbor: UMI [Microforms], 1997. Other treatments of the cogitative power also omit any direct account of its function with regard to language. Cf. Rudolph Allers, "The vis Cogitativa and Evaluation," *The New Scholasticism* 15 (1941): 195–221; Allers, "The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars," *The Thomist* 3.1 (January 1941), 95–163; Deborah Black, "Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Latin Transformations," *Topoi* 19 (2000): 59–75 (henceforth, "Imagination and Estimation"); John Deely, "Animal Intelligence and Concept-Formation," *The Thomist* 35.1 (1971): 43–93; Cornelio Fabro, "Knowledge and Perception in Aristotelico-Thomistic Psychology," *New Scholasticism* 12 (1938): 337–365; T. V. Flynn, "The Cogitative Power," *The Thomist* 16 (1953): 542–563; George P. Klubertanz, "St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular," *New Scholasticism* 26 (1952): 135–166; Anthony Lisska, "A Look at Inner Sense in Aquinas: A Long-Neglected Faculty Psychology," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 80 (2006): 1–19; Julien Peghaire, "A Forgotten Sense, The Cogitative According to St. Thomas Aquinas (part I)," *The Modern Schoolman* 20 (1943): 123–140; Peghaire, "A Forgotten Sense, The Cogitative According to St. Thomas Aquinas (part II)," *The Modern Schoolman* 20, (1943): 210–229; Robert Schmidt S.J. "Unifying Sense, Which?" *The New Scholasticism* 57.1 (1983): 1–21; Michael Stock, O.P. "Sense Consciousness According to St. Thomas," *The Thomist* 21 (1958): 415–486; Leo A. White, "The Picture Theory of the Phantasm," *Tópicos: revista de Filosofía* 29 (2005) (Ejemplar dedicado a: Los comentadores árabes y latinos de Aristóteles):131–156; "Why the Cogitative Power?" *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 72 (1998): 213–227.

8. David Braine in his *Human Person* presents the most extended treatment I have read. Other exceptions are Gilson and Kenny who make some remarks on this problem. Gilson, however, does not specify faculties, and Kenny develops his own doctrine of the imagination and fancy, which fails to properly articulate the points which will be the focus of this essay.

9. This contention assumes the Platonic-Aristotelian principle of faculty of differentiation (PoFD); a principle I cannot defend within this paper. Cf. Plato, *Republic*, V 477c–477e; Aristotle, *de Anima*, I, 1 403a1–20; II, 4. 415a18–21; Thomas Aquinas, *In III Sent.* d. 27.2.4.1ad3; *In DA* I. lt. 1; II. 4. lt. 6; III. lt. 8 n. 711; *ST* I. 77. 3; I-II.23.1; *DQdA*13. For Aquinas's Avicennian innovations and developments on the PoFD, see *DV* 15. 1 and 2.

10. Cf. *DV* 10.5; 15.1; *In DA* II. 6. Lt. 13.

11. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues*, The Paul Carus Lectures (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2001).

12. Although it would require a lengthy treatment of its own, it seems to me that linguistic-use is not an aspect of human being's specific difference, but rather is, like risibility, a property of being a rational animal.

13. Notable examples of this interpretation that I believe are guilty of this bifurcation are: Herbert McCabe, *On Aquinas*, ed. Brian Davies (London and New York: Continuum, 2008); and Pasnau, "Aquinas on Thought's Linguistic Nature," esp. n24; Pasnau, "The Turn

Toward Phantasms," in *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a 75–89* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9.4. cf. 272, 284–295, (esp. 293–294); and Boulter, "Aquinas and Searle on Singular Thoughts." Anthony Kenny's numerous but brief treatments on the topic are difficult to distill. At times he seems to make language exclusive to the intellect, however, he also notes the importance of placing thought into a sensory context. Further, he does recognize the role of the imagination in forming mental images when we are "speaking to ourselves," and hence, that phantasms, in Aquinas, are not pictures but very often are words or inner utterances of the imagination. Nevertheless, the latter exercises of the imagination never carry any semantic value for Kenny. Finally, his entire account of language use is primarily introduced and treated in his chapters and discussions on the intellect. (cf. Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind*, 47–57, 93–99, and esp. 112–113; *Metaphysics of Mind*, 123–139.) We should also note that Kenny's treatment of the cogitative power is marginal at best, and he often attributes operations that are specific to the cogitative power to either the imagination or the intellect. Whatever his precise position is on the latter, he certainly has omitted what is the crucial thesis of this paper, namely, that linguistic apprehension is a kind of incidental sensation. For a sampling of some of Kenny's more extended treatments of these problems see: Anthony Kenny, "Intellect and Imagination in Aquinas" in *Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Anthony Kenny (London and Melbourne: Macmillan, 1969; Repr. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 274–296. cf. 291–296, Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind*, 36–40, 47–57, esp. 93–99 and 111–117; *The Metaphysics of Mind*, 20–26, 110–139, and 156–158; "Intentionality: Aquinas and Wittgenstein," 249–256.

14. Notable exceptions are David Braine and Alasdair MacInytre, who thematically reiterate similar points throughout their work on language and human persons. See also the work of Etienne Gilson and John O'Callahan.

15. Cf. *DV* 24.3ad1; *ST* I. 79.10.ad2. It is crucial to make this distinction between rationality and the intellect properly speaking, because the failure to do so often results in the kinds of confusions I have indicated. Lonergan also stresses the importance of this point. "Now, just as human intellect is mainly reason, because it operates from sense as a starting-point, so the quiddity known by the human intellect is different in kind from that known by the angelic" *Verbum*, 32. "[T]he pure Thomist theory of intellect is to be sought in the Thomist account of angelic knowledge, and from that account J. Peghaire rightly begins his investigation of Thomist notions of intellect and reason" ibid., 33.

16. Cf. *ST* I. 77.3.

17. "There is, then, a very close relationship between thought and words, between the operation of the intellect and the use of language. But it is important not to overstate this relationship. Aquinas believed that any judgment which can be made can be expressed by a sentence ([*DV*] 2,4). It does not follow from this, nor does Aquinas maintain, that every judgment which is made *is* put into words, either publically or in the privacy of the imagination. . . . The understanding of simples is related to the entertaining of judgments as the use of individual words is related to the construction of sentences," Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind*, 49–50. Kenny's account is far subtler then this quote reveals, however, it is still instructive of his general account of linguistic-use. Linguistic-use does require the inner senses, because, as Kenny asserts, the imagination must provide a sensory-context for reference; nevertheless, semantic apprehension, even of singular terms, is exclusive to the intellect.

18. Cf. *DQdA* 1; *ST*. I. 75.2

19. Cf. *DQdA* 1; *ST*. I. 85. 3. See the excellent article, Carlos Bazán, "The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas' Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism" *AHDLMA* 64 (1997): 95–126.

20. Cf. *ST* I. 84. 7

21. Aristotle, *de Anima* II. 8, 420b8 (trans. Apostle) and *De Interpretatione*, I. 2. 16a20, (trans. Apostle)

22. Braine writes, "Indeed, in the inseparability of sentence and sense, we come upon the most extreme example of the unity of mind and body in an action, here not just the unity of intention and act in intentional action but the unity of understanding and speech in 'understandingly speaking.' And in 'understandingly hearing' we have the most unmistakable and rich example of the unity of the act of 'perceiving as' wherein what is perceived and how it is perceived (that is, not the means of perception but as what it is perceived) cannot be extricated from one another" *Human Person*, 352. Gilson writes, "The duality observed by the linguists in the words of language is but the reflex of that metaphysical duality of human nature and of the paradoxical condition of the human intellect. Man does not think without images. He ought therefore to have a body in order to be able to think. But the other animals have bodies and images; nevertheless, they do not think as man thinks. Seeing that they do not speak, their psychism ought to differ in nature from human psychism" *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 68. Cf. O'Callaghan, *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn*, 297–298.

23. *ST* I. 81. 1, obj. 1: See Aquinas's more extended treatment of the same problem in *DV*. 10.5.

24. *ST* I. 86. 1c. To treat this problem adequately, moreover would actually require a full account of how we are able to have intellectual cognition of singulars. I cannot do that here. For some of the different treatments of this problem see: Cf. Rudolf Allers, "The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars," *The Thomist* 3.1 (January 1941): 95–163; George P. Klubertanz, "St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular"; Francisco L. Peccorini, "Knowledge of the Singular: Aquinas, Suárez and Recent Interpreters," *The Thomist* 38 (1974): 606–655; Stephen Boulter, "Aquinas and Searle on Singular Thoughts," 59–78; Calvin G. Normore, "The Invention of Singular Thought" in *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment* ed. Henrik Lagerlund, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 5 (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2007), chap. 6, 109–128. Another article, while not focused on engaging this problem, but nevertheless does so with erudition and brevity, is Klima, "Semantic Principles of Aquinas."

25. *ST* I. 86.1, obj 2. *ST* I. 86.1, ad 2. For Aquinas's comments on this passage from the *de Anima* see: infra n29.

26. 26. *SCG* II. 73. p. 173 (cf. Leonine, 1961. n. 14): ". . . sed a virtutibus in quibus sunt phantasmata, scilicet imaginativa, memorativa et cogitativa . . . ." Cf. *ST* I. 89.5; *In Mem*. III. 15.215-16.226; 16.274-275.

27. Cf. *ST* I. 78.4; *DQdA*. 13. I have taken this distinction between the external and internal sensorium from Anthony Lisska, who is the earliest writer I have come across to make this distinction. However, when I asked him if it was of his coinage he replied that he was not sure of its origins, but suspected that he got it from somewhere else. Cf. Anthony Lisska, "Thomas Aquinas on *Phantasia*: Rooted in But Transcending Aristotle's *De Anima*" in *Aquinas' Sources*, ed. Timothy Smith (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine Press, 2001) n27: "One needs here to distinguish the external senses from the internal senses, and the external sensorium from the internal sensorium. The former pair is distinguished by the location of

the sense faculties, while the latter pair is distinguished by the intentional act itself. The faculties of the internal sensorium—imagination, the *vis cogitativa* and the sense memory—all require phantasms."

28. *ST* I. 78. 4.

29. *In DA* III. 10 (434a16) 251.128–133. Also, *DV* 10.5, 309.94–99: Both in his commentary on this *de Anima* text and in *de Veritate*, Aquinas divides practical reason into "universal reason" and "particular reason," which is one of many ways in which Aquinas distinguishes the intellect from the cogitative power. Cf. *DV* 10.5 ad 2, 309.106–110. *In Ethics* VI. lt. 1, n. 1123; lt. 7 nn. 1213–1215; lt. 9, nn. 1247, 1249, 1253, 1255, and 1256. Compare these latter passages with *ST* II-II. 49. 2 and 5.

30. *DV* 4.1, 120.192–207. Aquinas makes the same distinctions in *In Sent*. I. d. 27. 2. 1, and in *ST* I. 34.1.

31. *In Sent*. I. d. 27. 2. 1.

32. Cf. *De Potentia* 8.1 and *SCG* I. 53. It is important to not confuse the terminus of the intellect's operation with its principle, as so many readers of Aquinas are prone to do. Aquinas is very clear on this point; (1) the word of the heart, concept, and intention of the intellect are all distinct from (2) the intelligible species, (*species intelligibilis*) which is the form and principle of the intellect's operation, (3) the intellect itself, and (4) the intellect's operation. The word, concept, and intention are all synonyms for the terminus of the intellect's operation. See: *Quod.* V. 5. 2., which explicitly takes up the question on, "*Utrum verbum cordis sit species intelligibilis*." Aquinas concludes, "Unde necesse est quod species intelligibilis, quae est principium operationis intellectualis, *differat a verbo cordis*, quod est per operationem intellectus formatum." For an excellent study on this point see John F. Peifer, *The Concept of Thomism* (New York: The Bookman Associates, 1952). Later reprinted as *The Mystery of Knowledge* (New York: Magi Books, 1964) and again in *Modern Writings on Thomism*, ed. John Haldane (Bristol: Thoemmes, 2003).

33. Cf. *ST* I. 85. 2. Also, *In Ioannis*, c. 1, lect. 1 (26).

34. Gilson, *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 74–75. Pasnau holds a different interpretation of this sense of *verbum*. "Before giving voice to one's mental concepts one must formulate a kind of mental image of the utterance; one must mentally pick the very words one will use. This exemplar, this intermediary *verbum*, "is called the inner word that contains an image of the utterance," "Aquinas on Thought's Linguistic Nature," 555–566. In a note he writes, "Aquinas has in mind here the *De anima* 's claim that speech occurs "with some kind of imagination" (II 8, 420b32). (At *ST* 34.1c this connection is made explicit.) Evidently Aquinas does not understand Aristotle's claim in such a way that the inner sense of phantasia or imagination is involved: the operation Aquinas describes seems to be wholly intellectual" ibid. n. 24. Pasnau's interpretation is wrong. The context and examples given in *DV* 4. 1 and *ST* I. 34. 1 make it abundantly clear that Aquinas is referring to the inner sense of phantasia or imagination, and if there was any doubt it is unequivocally clear in, *In Sent.* I. d. 27. 2.1. Further, on Pasnau's interpretation Aquinas's conclusion in *ST* I. 34. 1, that only the word of the heart can be said of God in a non-metaphorical way, would not follow if "the operation Aquinas describes . . . [was] wholly intellectual." I also suspect a *homuncular* fallacy lies hidden within his remark that, "one must mentally pick the very words one will use." But perhaps he is innocently referring to the difficulty we sometimes have with selecting the best way to express a thought. Nevertheless, that is not what Aquinas is primarily referring to; though what he is referring to would be manifested in the latter phenomenon.

35. *In PH* I, lt. 2, 15 [5]. *ST* I. 13.1.

36. *In PH* I, lt. 2, 14 [4].

37. Technically, voice is not a faculty but a species of sound. Cf. *In DA*, II. 8, lt. 18.

38. John Haldane develops this line of argument at length in his, "The Life of Signs." He argues that speech-acts and various other kinds of linguistic terms only become semantically charged by the intentionality of mental states, and the latter, as Haldane shows, must be intrinsically intentional if we are to avoid an infinite regress. At the conclusion Haldane explains the reason how such mental states can be intrinsically meaningful. His answer follows closely Aquinas's account of formal causality in ideogenesis, in particular *SCG* I. 53, which accounts for the isomorphism between thought and reality. I am assuming Haldane's philosophical conclusions for the points being asserted here.

39. Cf. *In Sent.* I. d. 27. 2.1. and *ST* I. 34.1.

40. *In Sent.* I. d. 27. 2.1.

41. Cf. *ST* I. 13. ad. 1. For a comparison of the word in Aquinas's doctrine of God, angels and man see: Harm Goris, "The Angelic Doctor and Angelic Speech: The Development of Thomas Aquinas's Thought on How Angels Communicate," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 11 (2003): 87–105; "Theology and Theory of the Word in Aquinas: Understanding Augustine by Innovating Aristotle" in *Aquinas the Augustinian*, ed. Michael Dauphinais, Barry David, and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 62–78.

42. Of course, there are a variety of other forms of communication, even linguistic, through visual, auditory, and tactile mediums (perhaps even gustation and olfaction?). For the sake of brevity, this paper will only discuss language and linguistic terms as written and spoken.

43. It would require a work of its own to argue that language is actually hylomorphic, nevertheless I do believe there is some textual evidence that this is was Aquinas's position. Cf. *In Physics*, I. lt. 1, n. 5 and *In Physics*, II. lt. 5, nn. 183–184; *In Sensu* I. lect. 1.

44. Gilson, *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 47. The citation for the quote is Edward Sapir, *Language* (New York: Harvest Books, 1949 [1921]), 8–9. French translation: *Le langage* (Paris: Payot, 1967), 12.

45. Indeed, Aquinas makes this point explicit in the first chapter of his *In Sensu*, wherein he notes, following Aristotle, that we learn best through the hearing of sounds which can contain voice, i.e., significant intentions, and voice contains knowledge, nevertheless these intentions are themselves accidental to sound and hearing. *In Sensu* I.1.13–14.163–189. Also, *In Sensu* I.1.14.213–215. Also, *In Sensu* I.1.14–15.253–270, *In Sensu* I.1.15.273–303. Cf. *In Meta* I.1.

46. Cf. *ST* II-II.8.1.

47. Cf. *DV* 8.3; *SCG* I. 3, n. 4; II. 37, n. 2; IV. 55, n. 6; *ST* I. 1.9; 12. 12; 17. 1.

48. Cf. *In IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 2, a. 2c; *In DA* II. Lt. 13; and *ST* I. 17. 2.; 78. 3, ad 2.

49. *In DA* II. lt. 13. 118, 418a7–418a10.

50. A lot could be said concerning Aquinas's doctrine of external and internal sense faculties, but this would take us far beyond the scope of this paper. Unfortunately this forces me to present Aquinas's doctrine in a dogmatic fashion rather then defending it philosophically.

See the following articles which represent a sample of some of the best articles on sensation in Aquinas. Yves Simon, "An Essay on Sensation" in *Philosophy of Knowledge: Selected Readings*, ed. Roland Houde and Joseph P. Mullally (Chicago, Philadelphia, New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1960); Robert Henle, "The Basis of Philosophical Realism Re-Examined," *New Scholasticism* 56.1 (1982): 1–29; Paul MacDonald, "Direct Realism and Aquinas's Account of Sensory Cognition," *The Thomist* 71 (2007): 348–378; Debrah Black, "Imagination and Estimation"; Michael Stock, "Sense Consciousness According to St. Thomas."

51. *ST* I. 78.3 and *In DA* III. Lt. 1 n. 575: "the common sensibles are not sensed indirectly by any particular sense at all, but are directly sensed by many senses. Therefore the common sensibles cannot be the proper object of any particular sense" (my translation).

52. *In DA* II. 13, 120.164–170.

53. *In DA* II. lt. 13, 120.175–121.181.

54. The term *intentiones* was the Latin translation of Avicenna's term *ma'ānī* found in Avicenna's *De Anima*, IV and in his *Metaphysics of the Shifā'* (esp. I. 5, and V. 1). In Avicenna this notion is used with other terms like quiddity (*māhīyah*, *quidditas*) to help clarify thing (*shay'*, *res*) which is one of Avicenna's three primordial metaphysical notions (cf. *Metaphysics of the Shifā'* I. 5). Deborah Black writes, "What is emitted vocally signifies what is in the soul, and these are what are called impressions (āthāran), whereas what is in the soul signifies the things, and these are what are called *meanings*, that is, the intentions of the soul." See Black, "Imagination and Estimation", n12 (my emphasis).

55. See *ST* I. 78. 4. It is important to note that intention here should not be confused with either intentional being (*esse intentionale*) and immutation which includes all objects and operations of cognition (e.g., images, memories, intentions, intelligible species, concepts, etc. cf. *ST* I. 78. 3 and *In DA* II, lt. 24), or with "intentions" as that which is a willed end (cf. *ST* I-II q. 11. a. 1). There is an underlying analogical similarity but important distinctions—like that between the cognitive and appetitive—must be kept in mind to keep all three meanings precise.

56. For further references to the *vis cogitativa* see: *In Sent* III. d. 26.1.2; *DV* 1.11; 10.5; 15.1 ad 9; *SCG* II. 60; 73; 76; 81.3; *Quaestio Disputata de Anima*, 13.

57. *In IV Sent*. d. 50.1.1.ad3. For further references to the *intellectus passivus*: *SCG*. II. 60 and 73; *ST* I. 79.2.ad.2; *DQdA*. 13; *DSC*. 9.

58. For further references to the *ratio particularis*: *In Sent* II. d. 24.2.1 ad 3; IV d. 50.1.1 ad 3; *DV* 2.6; 10.5; 14.1 ad 9; 15.1; *SCG* II. 60; *In Nic. Ethic* VI. lt. 7; lt. 9; *In DA* II. lt. 16; *ST* I. 20.1 ad 1; 19.2 ad 2; 80.2 ad 3; I-II. 51.3.

59. *In DA* II. 13, 120.170–174. *In DA* II. 13, 121.182–183. *In DA* II. 13, 121.191–122.201.

60. This qualification would entail that intentions and semantic values are related asymmetrically. Every semantic value, whether universal or particular, is an intention, but not every intention as such has a semantic value. There also are important distinctions to be made concerning nominal and real definitions, intellectual insight into the meaning of a word (i.e., meaning as use), which signify the quiddities of material things, and then intellectual insight into quiddities.

61. As we have seen, Aquinas does have theological reasons for restricting the prime sense of *verbum* to our inner intellectual conceptions. Aquinas argues that the primary sense of *verbum* should not be attributed to our external words, but to that which has signifies

essentially and is intrinsically meaningful, namely, the preeminent *words* of our mind. What Aquinas wants to preserve is the Trinitarian analogy which employs the *verbum cordis* because it is a universal, immaterial, non-circumstantial expression of intellectual insight. This sense of *verbum cordis* is not diminished by Aquinas's analogical use of *verbum* to signify words spoken and imagined, and thus I see no reason why my suggestion to posit a *verbum cogitativae* should alter the Trinitarian analogy. There are commonalities between the word of the heart to the intention expressed by the cogitative, and these commonalities should be observed even when we are distinguishing them. The term *verbum cogitativae* aptly denotes what is distinctive of the cogitative's involvement in linguistic apprehension and expression.

62. *In DA* II. 13, 121.183–187. In other words, if the intellect forms a universal intention independent of any cognition of a sensible reality, this operation does not count as an incidental sensation. It only counts when the intention apprehended is cognized simultaneously with the sensation of some essential sensible. I might apprehend some particular intention like, "that is a puddle and I should walk around it," without actually expressing this apprehension and judged reaction in any linguistic manner at all. Anscombe's *Intention* is full of examples of this sort, which is not to confuse the fact that I am speaking of a cognitive intentions here, and she is treating appetitive intentions in her work.